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BAMN! THE SIXTH CIRCUIT STRIKES DOWN
MICHIGAN’S PROPOSAL 2
J. Kevin Jenkins, Ed.D.* & Pamela Larde, Ph.D.†
I. INTRODUCTION
For at least the last two decades, the University of
Michigan has had a formal policy of promoting racial and
ethnic diversity among its student body.1 To achieve this
diversity, various units of the university give some degree of
preference in the admissions process to persons from selected
racial and ethnic groups. Members of non-preferred groups,
along with some members of the preferred groups, have
objected to the policies, and legal and political battles have
ensued. These battles continue to this day, and the United
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to a case on this
issue for the October 2013 term.2
Some issues related to consideration of race in admissions at
the University of Michigan have already been ruled on
substantively by the Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger3 and

*
Associate Professor of Educational Leadership, Tift College of Education,
Mercer University.
†
Assistant Professor of Research, Tift College of Education, Mercer University.
1
The University may well have had such policies prior to the early nineties, Coal.
to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality
By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 470
(6th Cir. 2012), but the current formal policy of Michigan’s law school was adopted in
1992 and that of the University’s undergraduate school at least as early as 1995, Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 314–315 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).
2
BAMN, 701 F.3d 466, cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013). In October 2012, the Court heard oral
arguments on closely related issues in University of Texas at Austin v. Fisher on appeal
from the Fifth Circuit. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). The
Fisher case presented the Court with arguments that may or may not affect the status
of the BAMN appeal. If the Court holds all consideration of race unconstitutional,
then the BAMN appeal arguably becomes moot. But if the Court approves of some
consideration of race in the Texas case, then the related questions presented by the
BAMN case will likely become the next-most-pressing issue in the broad area of
consideration of race in admissions for the Court to reconcile.
3
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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Grutter v. Bollinger4 in 2003. In Gratz, the Court ruled that the

University of Michigan undergraduate college’s admissions
program amounted to a quota,5 and thus was unconstitutional.6
But on the same day, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the policy implemented by the University of Michigan Law
School in the Grutter case,7 the first case in which a majority
of the Court approved the use of non-remedial consideration
of race in the context of admissions decisions. Following the
Grutter decision, the people of Michigan amended their
Constitution through a ballot initiative (Proposal 2) that
prohibited the use of racial preferences by government
agencies, explicitly including public universities of the state. In
response to Proposal 2, a group known as the Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary
(BAMN) filed suit in federal court against the state, asserting
that Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Proposal 2 was upheld in federal district court in March
2008,8 and the case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. On November 15, 2012, the en banc appeals court held
in BAMN v. Regents of the University of Michigan9 that
Proposal 2 violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, restoring the university’s authority to
consider race as part of the admissions process. This Article will
give a brief history of the development of the BAMN10 case, a
description of the opinions by the District Court and the Sixth
Circuit, a discussion analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of

4

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

5

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 245.
6
Id, at 275.
7
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
8

Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 924 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
9
701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012).
10
In the Sixth Circuit opinion in this case, the court used the term “coalition” to
describe the group of plaintiffs. In this Article, the authors use the term “BAMN” to
refer both to the group of plaintiffs and the case itself. They do this to avoid
confusion with a Ninth Circuit case titled Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson,
which will also be mentioned in this Article.
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implications of the case.
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE BAMN CASE
In the early 1900s, the ability to pursue a college education
was still a privilege enjoyed by few. Student bodies largely
consisted of white males whose fathers were well-educated and
held high-profile jobs in medicine, law, or business.11 Many
distinct classes of people, including women and AfricanAmericans, were underrepresented in the major institutions of
higher education.12 In some cases, unmarried women were
allowed to attend in order to pursue a career in teaching.
However, if these women chose to marry, they were expected
to drop out of school.13 The few African-Americans who were
admitted into prestigious universities were often subjected to
racism from their peers, as well as from university faculty and
administrators. For example, in the 1920s at Harvard
University, African-Americans were not allowed to share dorm
rooms with their white peers. They had to choose between
footing the cost of rooming alone or finding another black
student with whom to room.14 Until World War II, Princeton
University did not admit black students into their
undergraduate programs, allowing them only to attend
Princeton’s Theological Seminary.15
A number of movements and initiatives challenged classic
universities to become more inclusive and accessible. Only a
few decades after the abolition of slavery, African-Americans
who desired to pursue a college education began opening their
own institutions, as they were not allowed to attend most of
the predominantly white colleges in the country.16 These
11

See generally Howard B. London, Transformations: Cultural Challenges Faced
by First-Generation
Students, 1992 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR COMTY. COLL. 5 (2006); see also GEORGE

MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT
ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF (1994).
12
MARSDEN, supra note 11.
13
London, supra note 11.
14
MARSDEN, supra note 11, at 359–60.
15
Id.
16
Id.
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institutions, known as Historically Black Colleges and
Universities (HBCUs), were established to educate AfricanAmericans in an era and a society that offered them few other
higher education opportunities.17
After the long history of racial exclusion and isolation in
institutions of higher education described above, the cultural
and legal tide began to turn in the mid-twentieth century. As a
result of Brown v. Board of Education,18 University of
California Regents v. Bakke,19 and other similar cases, as well as
general societal shifts, the need for equal access to and
participation in higher education for formerly excluded
groups became an increasing priority in America. But while the
ideal of increased participation is laudable by modern ethical
standards, the mechanics of a system that might lead to such an
increase at highly competitive institutions, while at the same
time surviving legal challenges, have been difficult to develop.
In order to increase participation of historically excluded
groups, individual members of those groups must be both
willing and qualified to participate. Colleges and universities
have been faced with a chronic scarcity of qualified minority
applicants for admission, particularly at institutions to which
admission is highly competitive.20

17
Thomas F. Nelson Laird et al., African American and Hispanic Student
Engagement at Minority Serving and Predominantly White Institutions, 40 J.C.

STUDENT DEV. 39 (2007). Today, HBCUs are highly successful in retaining and
graduating African-Americans who go on to pursue graduate and doctoral degrees. In
fact, African-Americans who attend these institutions tend to have greater academic
success than African-Americans who attend predominantly white institutions. Women
also began to establish all-female colleges across the country, providing educational
opportunities to this underrepresented group. As a result of the establishment and
growth of these institutions after World War I, the number of African-Americans and
women who took advantage of the opportunity to pursue a college education
increased sharply. See London, supra note 11; MARSDEN, supra note 11.
18
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
20
See generally RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, MISMATCH: HOW
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY
UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT (2012); see also, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
253–54 (2003) (“During all periods relevant to this litigation, the University has
considered African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans to be
‘underrepresented minorities,’ and it is undisputed that the University admits
‘virtually every qualified . . . applicant’ from these groups.”).
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The literature on this subject offers various explanations
for the phenomenon. Due to economic, social, and racial
disparities—disparities that are largely attributed to segregated
neighborhoods that offer inferior educational resources21—
students of color (particularly African-Americans, Latinos, and
American Indians) struggle to access the opportunities of
higher education that exist in the United States. These groups
are more likely to attend public schools with high
concentrations of students of color from low socioeconomic
backgrounds and do not receive the academic preparation or
critical information needed to advance to college.22
Even when students of color from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds are college-qualified and have strong academic
credentials, they are still reported to enroll in college at
relatively low rates.23 This disparity has been attributed to the
lack of support first-generation students receive from their
families and influential adults in their lives.24 In fact, many are
discouraged from aspiring to a college education by family,
peers, and even teachers and administrators in their schools.25
The full explanation for the ongoing scarcity of qualified
persons from historically excluded groups is complex, with
contributing factors varying with the individual, and will be
the subject of ongoing debate among social scientists for the
foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the fact remains that
competitive institutions of higher education have found it
difficult to find what they consider to be a sufficient number
of such persons.26 Consequently, institutions have at times

21

Nelson Laird et al., supra note 17, at 39–56.
Id. at 41.
23
LAURA HORN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH &
IMPROVEMENT, MAPPING THE ROAD TO COLLEGE: FIRST-GENERATION STUDENTS’
MATH TRACK, PLANNING STRATEGIES, AND CONTEXT OF SUPPORT (2000), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2000/2000153.pdf. Of the highly qualified first-generation
students in Horn’s study, approximately 25% were not enrolled at a four-year
institution and another 13% had not enrolled at any postsecondary institution.
24
Jennifer Engle et al., Straight From the Source: What Works for FirstGeneration College Students, 23 THE PELL INST. 1 (2006).
25
Id. See also R.G. Fryer, “Acting White”: The Social Price Paid by the Best &
Brightest Minority Students, 6 EDUC. NEXT 53 (2006), available at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fryer/files/aw_ednext.pdf.
26
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003). Justice O’Connor, writing for the
22
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resorted to granting preferential treatment to minorities in the
admissions process by effectively lowering objective
admissions standards as they apply to preferred applicants.27
Individuals from groups treated as over-represented have
objected to preferential systems due to the fact that a
preference to members of one race necessarily penalizes
members of non-preferred races, given the limited number of
seats in a class.
Among the first lawsuits related to consideration of race in
admissions from the field of higher education was University
of California Regents v. Bakke.28 Allan Bakke, a white
applicant to medical school at the University of CaliforniaDavis, had been denied admission in favor of objectively lessqualified applicants pursuant to the medical school’s quota
system, which was designed to ensure a certain percentage of
minority students.29 Finding meaning from the Bakke decision
has been difficult from the start, even to members of the
Court who issued the opinion.30 At least three firm principles
may be taken from Bakke, however: 1) race-based quotas are
unconstitutional,31 2) the Fourteenth Amendment does not
always prohibit governmental consideration of race,32 and 3) all

majority, noted that the Director of Admissions at the University of Michigan Law
School testified at trial that “she must consider the race of applicants because a critical
mass of underrepresented minority students could not be enrolled if admissions
decisions were based primarily on undergraduate GPAs and LSAT scores.” Id.
27
Id. at n.20.
28
438 U.S. 265 (1978). Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (ruling that the
plaintiff’s case was moot due to his provisional admission during pendency of the
trial).
29
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
30
Id. at 324–25 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the mature
consideration which each of our Brethren has brought to [this case has] resulted in
many opinions, no single one speaking for the Court”).
31
Id. at 289 (“To the extent that there existed a pool of at least minimally
qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions seats, white applicants
could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to
minority applicants. Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a
line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status.”). Arguably, even drawing this
principle from Bakke was debatable because the Justices who agreed with Justice
Powell that Allan Bakke must be admitted to the medical school thought that his
statutory right to admission was sufficient and the constitutional question should not
have been reached.
32
Id. at 325 (“Mr. Justice Powell agrees that some uses of race in university
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governmental decision-making processes that consider race
must pass strict judicial scrutiny.33 The inherent tension in
these principles was apparent in the several concurring and
dissenting opinions in Bakke, and in the state of confusion in
equal protection law that prevailed after Bakke.34 In fact, even
these three principles were the subject of ongoing judicial and
political battles, and the narrow and shifting majorities
supporting each of them in the Bakke decision made them
somewhat shaky legal ground for a time.35 In the three decades
after Bakke, though, the law has developed to a point where all
three of these principles have been solidified to reliability.36
While these principles from Bakke were settled relatively
quickly, a part of Justice Powell’s opinion that was arguably
dicta had what might be considered a greater impact on both
the law and politics. Specifically, his statement that race could,

admissions are permissible and, therefore, he joins with us [Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun] to make five votes reversing the judgment below insofar as it
prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious programs in the future.”).
33
Id. at 291. “[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”
Id. “Unquestionably we have held that a government practice or statute which restricts
‘fundamental rights’ or which contains ‘suspect classifications’ is to be subjected to
‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government
purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.” Id. at 357.
34
John Dayton, An Analysis of Judicial Opinions Concerning the Legal Status
of Racial Diversity Programs in Educational Institutions, 133 ED. LAW REP. 297, 314
(1999) (“The Court’s fragmented decisions in affirmative action cases have produced
more heat than light, resulting in significant confusion concerning the legal status of
race-conscious programs.”).
35
See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to the affirmative action program at issue due to its purportedly benign
intentions), overturned by Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that strict
scrutiny applies to all governmental classifications based on race).
36
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle, 551 U.S. 701, 726 (2007) (“[T]he plans
are directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has
repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.”). “It is well established that when the
government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial
classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.” Id. at 720. “This Court
has recently reiterated, however, that ‘all racial classifications [imposed by government]
. . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’” Id. at 741 (internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)
(“[G]overnmental action based on race—a group classification long recognized as in
most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be subjected to
detailed judicial inquiry” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)).
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consistent with strict scrutiny, be considered a plus factor
spawned a movement toward the acceptance of race as a
compelling governmental interest in admissions decisions.37 In
spite of the fact that none of Justice Powell’s colleagues joined
him in the part of the Bakke opinion upholding diversity as a
compelling governmental interest, colleges and universities
across the country tailored admissions plans to satisfy his plusfactor statement.38
Given the at-that-time tenuous nature of Justice Powell’s
diversity rationale, members of non-preferred racial groups
who had been denied admission under diversity plans sued.
Cases from universities in Georgia, Texas, Washington, and
Michigan all made it to federal appellate courts with varying
results.39 Culminating the process by which the diversity
rationale made its way through the appellate circuits were the
Supreme Court cases Gratz v. Bollinger40 and Grutter v.
Bollinger.41 In these cases, the undergraduate program and the
law school at the University of Michigan, respectively, were
sued for considering race in the admissions process. However,
while the law school had developed a plan that ultimately
survived the Court’s strict scrutiny,42 the plan implemented by
the undergraduate school did not.

37
38

See generally PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT (2003).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (“Public and private universities across the Nation have

modeled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible raceconscious policies.”).
39
Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that student
body diversity is not a compelling governmental interest that justifies racial
preferences in admissions) and Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d
1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (striking down a diversity program as not narrowly tailored, but
opining that diversity is not a compelling interest) with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law
Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding in both cases that student body diversity does constitute a compelling
governmental interest that justifies racial preferences in university admissions).
40
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
41
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
42
In upholding the law school’s admissions plan, the Grutter Court held for the
first time that student body diversity could serve as a compelling governmental
interest. While recognizing the difficulty courts had had in determining the weight to
accord Justice Powell’s notion of diversity, the Grutter majority essentially adopted it,
effectively settling the issue to a large degree in the context of higher education
admissions decisions for the time being.
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The Court’s decisions in Grutter and Gratz had both legal
and political ramifications. Concerning the law of racial
preferences in admissions, institutions of higher education can
use the Grutter and Gratz decisions as guidance for their
admissions policies as they pertain to the promotion of
diversity. Based on Grutter, absent any state law provisions to
the contrary, for a limited time colleges may legally consider
race as one of many plus factors in the admissions process, so
long as they do not isolate preferred minorities from
competition in the process. Based on Gratz, however, they must
do so in a narrowly tailored manner.43 What constitutes narrow
tailoring is still difficult to define, and is dependent on the
totality of the admissions process. But in Gratz the Court
found that granting twenty of 100 points total based solely on
race was not narrow tailoring, and, in fact, approached being a
quota.44
From a political perspective, while the Grutter decision
outlined to some degree the permissible boundaries of
consideration of race in the admissions process, it did not
mandate its consideration. Instead, universities that chose to
grant a plus factor could do so consistent with Grutter and
applicable state law. After Grutter, advocates for racial
neutrality in the admissions process sought to change Michigan
law to prohibit the consideration of race at the public colleges
and universities of the state through a ballot initiative
commonly referred to as Proposal 2. They succeeded in doing
so, ultimately leading to an amendment to the Michigan
Constitution that states in relevant part:

43

See William Thro, The Constitutionality of Racial Preferences in K-12
Education After Grutter & Gratz, 211 ED. LAW REP. 537, 551 (2006) (“With respect to this
narrow tailoring process in the context of educational admissions, Grutter and Gratz

decreed that such programs must provide for individualized consideration; be
undertaken only after a serious good faith consideration of the viability of non–racial
alternatives; not unduly burden non–minorities; and be periodically reviewed and of
limited duration.”).
44
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272 (“[U]nlike Justice Powell's example, where the race of a
‘particular black applicant’ could be considered without being decisive . . . the LSA’s
automatic distribution of 20 points has the effect of making ‘the factor of race . . .
decisive’ for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority
applicant.”).
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(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State
University, and any other public college or university, community College,
or school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education or public contracting.
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.
(3) For the purposes of this section “state” includes, but is not necessarily
limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public college, university, or
community college, school district, or other political subdivision or
governmental instrumentality of or within the State of Michigan not
45
included in sub-section 1.

As a result of this amendment, Michigan’s public
universities were legally forestalled from granting racial
preferences to candidates for admission. But the legal battle
was not over as advocates of racial preferences, while fighting
the political battle, had simultaneously prepared to file a
complaint alleging that Proposal 2 violated the Federal
Constitution.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION IN BAMN
Proposal 2 went into effect December 3, 2006, but by that
time, two separate groups of plaintiffs had already filed suit
asserting that it violated the U.S. Constitution and federal
Collectively,47 the plaintiffs sought to overturn
law.46
Proposal 2 as it applied to university admissions, arguing that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and Title IX of the Education

45
46

2008).

MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 924, 932 (E.D. Mich.

47
As noted above, there were two different groups of plaintiffs, each advancing
theories that overlapped in some areas and differed in others. Since the details of
which plaintiffs asserted which arguments are not important to the substance of this
article, the authors will treat the claims as if they were from one group of plaintiffs.
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Amendments of 1972.48
The district court began its analysis of the substantive
issues by addressing the Equal Protection claims of the
plaintiffs. It did so through two different lenses: conventional
Equal Protection analysis and analysis under the
Hunter/Seattle49 line of Supreme Court cases. Additionally, the
court ruled on arguments that Proposal 2 was preempted by
federal law. Regarding the conventional equal protection
analysis, the court observed that “college admission at elite
universities is a zero-sum enterprise, and programs that prefer
some students on the basis of race must do so necessarily at the
expense of other applicants not of the preferred race.”50 In
light of this “stark reality,” the district court detailed Supreme
Court holdings that establish strict scrutiny as the standard for
all racial classifications by all levels of government in the
United States.51
Applying conventional equal protection analysis, the court
noted that the first step in the process “is to determine whether
the challenged legislation draws any classification.”52 Further,
“the determining factor is not whether the enactment has race
as its subject matter, but whether it facially purports to accord
unequal treatment across racial lines.”53 Holding that Proposal 2
is facially neutral, the court then sought to determine whether
it “was motivated by a racial purpose or object, or is
unexplainable on grounds other than race.”54 The court found
no evidence of intent to discriminate via the facially neutral
Proposal 2 and noted the problematic nature of assigning

48
49

BAMN, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 933.

Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 458
U.S. 457 (1982).
50
BAMN, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
51
Id. at 948–49 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–90
(1978); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (noting two Supreme
Court opinions, one in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), and another in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), both applying intermediate
scrutiny to racial classifications, but citing the portion of the Adarand decision
specifically overturning Metro Broadcasting).
52
BAMN, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 949–50 (citing Moore v. Detroit Sch. Reform Bd., 293 F.3d 352, 368 (6th Cir.
2002)).
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intent to an entire electorate in any case.55 Concluding its
traditional equal protection analysis, the court noted that
while sufficient evidence of a disparate impact on minorities
would result from Proposal 2 to warrant a trial,56 there was
insufficient evidence of a discriminatory purpose.57 Thus,
summary judgment for the defendant was warranted under
the traditional equal protection analysis.
Turning to the Hunter/Seattle58 equal protection analysis,
the court described the plaintiff’s argument as follows:
They reason that before Proposal 2, minority groups could petition
university officials to implement affirmative action programs, or at least
consider race among a host of non-academic factors in making admissions
decisions. However, after Proposal 2, the only way racial minorities can
secure programs that account for race in the assembly of a student body is to
seek and obtain passage of another constitutional amendment. That daunting
process, they contend, imposes a unique and heavy burden upon them as a
class and unconstitutionally distances them from the political process when
they seek what the law allows, even if what they seek can be characterized as
59
an advantage.

The court accepted the plaintiff’s contention that Proposal
2 made it more difficult for minorities to pass legislation in
their interests.60 Nonetheless, the court recognized the
difference between laws prohibiting unequal treatment based
on race and those that provide for racial preferences.61 Based on
55
Id. at 950 (“Examining intent in the context of a ballot initiative presents a
unique problem due to the sheer number of individuals whose intent is relevant.”).
56
Id. at 951.
57
Id. “It is the demonstration of a discriminatory purpose that vexes the
Coalition plaintiffs and dooms their conventional equal protection argument, since
the plaintiffs must show that Proposal 2 was enacted ‘because of, not merely in spite
of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’” Id. The court further noted the
testimony of both Ward Connerly and Jennifer Gratz, two of the chief proponents of
Proposal 2, in which both articulated non-discriminatory reasons for espousing the
measure.
58
As the Hunter/Seattle test is the basis upon which the Sixth Circuit overturned
Proposal 2, the authors will explain it in further detail in the context of that opinion
below.
59
BAMN, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 953.
60
Id. at 956 (“There is no question, therefore, that Proposal 2 makes it more
difficult for minorities to obtain official action that is in their interest.”).
61
Id. at 956–57 (citing Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 708 (9th Cir.
1997)) (“While the Constitution protects against obstructions to equal treatment, it
erects obstructions to preferential treatment by its own terms.”).
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this distinction, the court held, “Michigan may limit the
ability of discrete groups to secure an advantage based upon a
racial classification without offending the Fourteenth
Amendment.”62 Therefore, the Hunter/Seattle equal protection
argument of the plaintiffs failed.
Having held that Proposal 2 did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause under either a traditional equal protection
analysis or the Hunter/Seattle test, the district court turned its
attention to the preemption argument. The plaintiffs claimed
that both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972 preempt Proposal 2. In
order to preempt a state statute or a state constitutional
provision, Congress must intend to do so, and this intent must
be either expressed or implied in the federal statute or
regulation in question.63 In some cases, congressional intent to
preempt is implied when a conflict exists which makes it
physically impossible to comply with federal and state law
simultaneously.64 It is this type of conflict preemption that is
recognized by the terms of Title VI.65 The court noted that
while Title IX is a gender-based analogue to Title VI, it also
contains an express provision that it does not mandate
preferential treatment. Finding that Proposal 2 contains
language that resolves any conflict between federal and state
law in favor of federal law if compliance with state law would
result in a loss of federal funds such as those provided by
Titles VI and IX,66 the court held that Proposal 2 is not
preempted by either federal statute.

62
63

Id. at 957.

The power of Congress to preempt state law derives from the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution (“the Laws of the United States, which shall be made
in Pursuance [of the Constitution] . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
64
For a clear and concise explanation of the general law of federal preemption
of state law, see Richard J. Scislowski, Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co. : A New Defense
of State Tort Law Against Federal Preemption—Is It Legitimate?, 28 AKRON L. REV.
373, 374–376 (1995).
65
BAMN, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 958 (“By its terms, Title VI recognizes conflict
preemption only.”).
66
Id. at 958.
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IV. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT OPINION IN BAMN
In contrast to the district court, the Sixth Circuit ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs, holding that Proposal 2 did violate the
Equal Protection Clause.67 As they had at the district court
level, the plaintiffs in BAMN advanced two theories for why
Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause: first, under a
“political process” equal protection analysis and second, under
a more conventional equal protection analysis regarding the
impermissible classification of individuals based on race.68
Regarding the political process argument, the BAMN court
relied on the Supreme Court cases Hunter v. Erickson69 and
Washington v. Seattle School District No.1.70 Citing Seattle, the
BAMN court stated that “[i]t is beyond dispute . . . that given
racial or ethnic groups may not be denied the franchise, or
precluded from entering into the political process in a reliable
and meaningful manner.”71 Citing Hunter, the court declared
that “the State may no more disadvantage any particular group
by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf
than it may dilute any person’s vote or give any group a
smaller representation than another of comparable size.”72
According to the Sixth Circuit, the application of these
principles to Proposal 2 is as follows: Prior to the passage of
Proposal 2, anyone seeking to change admission policy for any
reason could do so by lobbying either the admissions
committees that made such decisions by lobbying the
administrative structure up to and including the governing
boards of the respective universities or, as actually happened,
the people of Michigan directly.73 After the passage of Proposal

67

BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., Nos. 08-1387/1534 at *36 (6th Cir. 2012),

available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0386p-06.pdf [hereinafter
BAMN II] (“Finding those provisions of Proposal 2 affecting Michigan’s public

colleges and universities unconstitutional, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment
granting the Defendants-Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.”).
68
Id. at *9.
69
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
70
458 U.S. 457 (1982).
71
BAMN II, Nos. 08-1387/1534 at *10.
72
Id.
73
Id. at *4. Notably, lobbying the legislature was not an option in this case
because the public universities of Michigan have plenary authority, pursuant to the
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2, these processes were still available to anyone seeking to
change admission policy for any reason other than race, sex,
ethnicity, or national origin.74 In contrast, anyone wishing to
reinstate the consideration of race in the admission process
would have to succeed in what the BAMN court considered
the more burdensome process of another constitutional
amendment repealing Proposal 2. Relying on Hunter and
Seattle, the court stated:
[E]qual protection of the laws is more than a guarantee of equal treatment
under existing law. It is also a guarantee that minority groups may
meaningfully participate in the process of creating these laws and the
majority may not manipulate the channels of change so as to place unique
75
burdens on issues of importance to them.

Even so, the court recognized that “the Constitution does
not protect minorities from political defeat: Politics necessarily
produces winners and losers.”76 The task for the Sixth Circuit,
then, was to identify a method of determining whether a
political process was legitimate, even though it may produce
results that are undesirable to minorities. Drawing upon the
Hunter and Seattle decisions, the court identified the two
prongs of what it called the Hunter/Seattle test. Under this
test, minority groups are denied equal protection when a
governmental act:
(1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that “inures primarily to
the benefit of the minority”; and (2) reallocates political power or reorders
the decisionmaking process in a way that places special burdens on a minority
77
group’s ability to achieve its goals through that process.

Applying the Hunter/Seattle test to Proposal 2, the Sixth
Circuit found that it had a racial focus because the affirmative
action programs prohibited by the amendment primarily

Michigan Constitution, to control the universities. Id. at *20.
74
The court discounted Proposal 2’s prohibition of discrimination based on sex,
ethnicity, and national origin as being irrelevant to the issue. Id. at n.4. See Justice
Gibbons’ dissenting opinion for a strong counter-argument. Id. at *44.
75
Id. at *10.
76
Id. at *11.
77
Id. at *15.
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benefitted minorities.78 Comparing the affirmative action
programs in question to the integrative busing programs at
issue in Seattle, the court reasoned that “[j]ust as the
desegregative busing programs at issue in Seattle were designed
to improve racial minorities’ representation at many public
schools … race-conscious admissions policies increase racial
minorities’ representation at institutions of higher
education.”79 Further, the BAMN court stated that “it is
enough that minorities may consider [the repealed policy] to be
‘legislation that is in their interest.’”80 Applying this standard,
the court found that the policies repealed by Proposal 2 “inure
primarily to the benefit of racial minorities, and that such
groups consider these policies to be in their interest.”81
The BAMN court also found that Proposal 2 satisfied the
second prong of the Hunter/Seattle test. The court started by
explaining why the admissions process at the public
universities of Michigan constitutes part of the political
structure.82 Citing supplemental briefings from the university
defendants, the court stressed the plenary role of the policymaking boards of the universities83 and the fact that the
members of the boards are popularly elected. Additionally,
these elected boards have “enacted bylaws—which they have
complete authority to revise or revoke—detailing admissions
procedures.”84 The court recognized that the boards delegate
this responsibility to admissions committees, but found this
fact irrelevant because policy boards can and do change
admissions bylaws frequently.85 Thus, the court considered the

78

BAMN II, Nos. 08-1387/1534 at *17 (“There is no material difference between the
enactment in Seattle and Proposal 2, as both targeted policies that benefit minorities by
enhancing their educational opportunities and promoting classroom diversity.”).
79
Id.
80
Id. at *18.
81
Id.
82
Id. at *19–*23.
83
Id. at *20. Indeed, the boards are described as “the highest form of juristic
person known to the law, a constitutional corporation of independent authority,
which, within the scope of its functions, is co-ordinate with and equal to that of the
legislature.” Id.
84
BAMN II, Nos. 08-1387/1534 at *21.
85
Id. (“Since 2008, the University of Michigan’s Board of Regents has revised
more than two dozen of its bylaws, two of which fall within Chapter VIII, the section
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admissions process to be part of the political process in
Michigan.
Having decided the question of the political nature of the
admissions process, the BAMN court turned to whether
Proposal 2 reordered the political process so as to place a special
burden on minority interests. Noting that Hunter and Seattle
established that both explicit and implicit restructuring
satisfied this prong of the test,86 the BAMN court stated that
“any ‘comparative structural burden,’ be it local or statewide or
national, satisfies the reordering prong of the Hunter/Seattle
test.”87 In Hunter, the political process had been altered so that
changes related to housing and race had to gain the approval of
both the City Council and a majority of the electorate.88 Even
more burdensome, in Seattle, changes in school busing based
on race had to gain the approval of either the state legislature
or the statewide electorate.89 The Sixth Circuit found the
political process to be altered as unfavorably to the interests of
minorities by Proposal 2 as by either of the processes at issue in
Hunter or Seattle. The court listed several different levels of
government to which an interested party could apply for a
change in admissions standards in any area other than race,
including the ultimate process of constitutional amendment
via ballot initiative. In contrast, parties interested in changing
admissions standards in the area of race, after Proposal 2, had
only the constitutional amendment process available to them.90
At trial, the Michigan Attorney General (AG) tried to
distinguish Proposal 2 from the procedural changes in Hunter
and Seattle. Specifically, the AG argued that prohibiting
preferential treatment of a group by the government, as
Proposal 2 did, is different than prohibiting discrimination,91 as
the procedural changes in Hunter and Seattle had done. The

regulating admissions practices.”).
86
Id. at *24 (discussing the explicit nature of the restructuring in Hunter and the
implicit restructuring in Seattle).
87
Id. at *25.
88
Id. at *24.
89
Id.
90
BAMN II, Nos. 08-1387/1534 at *25-26.
91
Id. at *27.
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BAMN court found this argument unpersuasive. The court
also specifically rejected a Ninth Circuit ruling on an
analogous issue,92 holding, in effect, that the outcome of
Proposal 2 was not the problem, but rather the change in
process that it brought about.93
V. DISCUSSION
Given the politically controversial94 nature of the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion, it is unlikely that the BAMN decision will
settle the matter of a state’s authority to prohibit affirmative
action programs at the state level through ballot initiatives.
This is particularly true in light of the fact that the Ninth
Circuit reached a contradictory conclusion in a case dealing
with Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative. In
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson,95 the Ninth Circuit
held that an amendment to the California Constitution, with
substantially similar requirements to those of Proposal 2, did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.96 As a result of these
diametrically opposed decisions, both rendered by federal
appellate courts, uncertainty exists in this area of law.
Moreover, the lack of clarity touches on two specific areas of
national importance: principles of federalism and the
individual right to equal protection of the law. Considering
the important issues involved, the split among the two federal
appellate courts that ruled on the issue, and the reality of
continuing efforts to pass similar initiatives in other states,
careful analysis of the court’s opinion is warranted. In this
section, the authors provide this analysis, focusing first on the

92
93

Id. at n.8 (citing Coal.for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 707 (1997)).

BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 487 (2012) (“The
distinction urged by the Attorney General and the dissenters thus erroneously imposes
an outcome-based limitation on a process-based right. What matters is whether racial
minorities are forced to surmount procedural hurdles in reaching their objectives over
which other groups do not have to leap. If they are, the disparate procedural treatment
violates the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the objective sought.”).
94
That the opinion is controversial is certain. The reader will remember that the
court overturned the will of a majority of voters in Michigan with the BAMN
decision.
95
122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
96
Id.
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strengths of the decision and second on its vulnerabilities.

A. Strengths of the BAMN Opinion
There are reasons to believe that the Sixth Circuit’s opinion
in the BAMN case constitutes a faithful application of
Supreme Court precedent and of the principle of equal
protection. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit based its opinion on
the Court’s opinions in Hunter v. Erickson97 and Washington
v. Seattle School District No.1,98 which focus on political
process theory. In doing so, the court made arguments that are
at least rational and must be addressed. As noted above, the
Hunter/Seattle test states that a governmental action violates
the Equal Protection Clause if it:
(1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that “inures primarily to
the benefit of the minority”; and (2) reallocates political power or reorders
the decisionmaking process in a way that places special burdens on a minority
99
group’s ability to achieve its goals through that process.

It is clear by the language of the amendment that Proposal 2
has, at least in part, a racial focus. Further, in light of evidence
presented to the Court in Grutter and Gratz, it is equally clear
that many individual members of minority groups have
benefitted from the affirmative action programs prohibited by
Proposal 2. Thus, it is at least a rational argument that the two
articulated elements of the first prong of the Hunter/Seattle
test are met.
Likewise, there is rational support for the contention that
the second prong of the Hunter/Seattle test is met. If one
accepts, arguendo, that the first prong of the Hunter/Seattle
test is met, it is almost beyond debate that Proposal 2 worked a
reordering of the decision-making process in Michigan with
regard to consideration, inter alia, of race in admission
decisions. Further, given the nature of mathematics, an
argument can be made that minorities are less likely to be able
to effect a reimplementation of affirmative action after
Proposal 2 than they would be able to if the admission

97

393 U.S. 385 (1969).
458 U.S. 457 (1982).
99
BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 477 (2012).
98
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committees in question changed policies. Thus, it is at least
rational that the two articulated elements of the second prong
of the Hunter/Seattle test are met.
The three above paragraphs describe the essence of the
Sixth Circuit majority’s reasons for striking down Proposal 2,
without missing much in the way of important details.
Frankly, to the reader with a healthy level of skepticism, the
foundation of the BAMN decision as articulated by the court
is thin. However, the Grutter Court’s reliance on academic
freedom as the basis for upholding the affirmative action
programs in question may provide additional support for the
BAMN decision. Specifically, the Court stated, “We have long
recognized that, given the important purpose of public
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment, universities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”100 Based
on this concept, the Grutter Court arguably set aside
universities as almost an extra state constitutional entity.101
After all, it used the special niche of universities, grounded in
the First Amendment, to support the notion that the usual
restrictions of the Equal Protection Clause do not constrain
universities when it comes to academic decisions. One might
extend this logic to argue that, if an explicit provision of the
U.S. Constitution does not constrain a university in its choice
of students then, a fortiori, neither can a state constitutional
provision.102

B. Weaknesses of the BAMN Opinion
The arguments described above lend some support to the
idea that Proposal 2 does violate the Equal Protection Clause
under the political process theory. In spite of these arguments,
several weaknesses exist in the BAMN opinion. The dissenting

100

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
This extra-constitutional status of public universities may even be stronger in
Michigan than other states, considering the extraordinary provisions in the Michigan
constitution related to the plenary authority of university governing boards. See supra
note 73.
102
This argument, of course, would have no application to the provisions of
Proposal 2 relating to areas other than higher education.
101
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opinions argued some of these points forcefully, pointing out,
inter alia, that “a core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race,”103 that Hunter and Seattle are
inappropriate as precedents to BAMN due to fundamental
differences in the underlying programs,104 that the admissions
programs at Michigan’s universities were not really political in
nature,105 and that Proposal 2 does not focus solely on race, but
instead prohibits preferences for groups that, added together,
make a majority.106
The various dissents offered strong arguments against the
majority’s application of political process theory in the BAMN
case. But there is a more fundamental argument that political
process theory is flawed per se. For example, regarding the first
prong of the Hunter/Seattle test, the Sixth Circuit held that
the affirmative action programs in question were of primary
benefit to minority interests.107 If this is true, it contradicts the
primary reasoning employed by the Grutter Court to uphold
these plans in the first place. Justice O’Connor, writing for the
majority in Grutter, clearly grounded the Court’s holding in
the First Amendment right of universities to decide who gets
to study there, based on what contributions a person can make
to the intellectual atmosphere of a class.108 Thus, it was for the
good of all persons involved in university life, not just for the
sake of minority interests, that diversity was a compelling
interest in Grutter. Any holding to the contrary, specifically

103

BAMN, 701 F.3d at 493 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Id. at 48, 93–98.
105
Id. at 52.
106
Id. at 67 (Sutton, J., dissenting).
107
Id. at 479 (“We find that the holistic race-conscious admissions policies now
104

barred by Proposal 2 inure primarily to the benefit of racial minorities, and that such
groups consider these policies to be in their interest.”).
108
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“The Law School’s concept of
critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce. These benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized,
the Law School’s admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to
break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of
different races.’ These benefits are ‘important and laudable,’ because ‘classroom
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting’
when the students have ‘the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’”).
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one that supported non-remedial preferences for members of
preferred racial groups, would arguably be in opposition to the
foundational principle of the rule of law and the related
principle of equal protection of the law. Without the
justification of benefits to the academic marketplace of ideas
as a whole, it is possible that the law school’s plan that
instigated Proposal 2 would have been held unconstitutional in
2003.
Moreover, the BAMN court appears to have adopted a
stance that is unjustifiably deferential to the plaintiffs when it
comes to their claims to represent minority interests. It is one
thing to defer to the expertise of university officials in
academic matters, but quite another to defer to advocacy
groups seeking preferential treatment under the law.
Specifically, the phrase “in the interest of minorities”109 is so
vague as to be subject to manipulation in service of special
interests at the expense of equal protection and the rule of law.
The court compounded this problem by imposing no
limitations on things for which citizens could lobby, using
such strong language as “whatever [their objectives] are.”110 The
use of such language begs carrying the argument to its logical
extreme. The logical extreme of distributing benefits and
burdens along racial lines has been carried out in practicality in
America, and the results have undermined rather than
supported equality before the law, to say nothing of human
dignity. If the Sixth Circuit was justified in its deference to
“the interests of racial minorities,”111 how could any principled
basis exist for limiting the allocation of benefits to members
of minority groups? Where could any lines be drawn that were
not arbitrary and unattached to principle? What of the rights
of minorities who do not wish to be evaluated based on their
skin color? The questions answer themselves and highlight the
arbitrary and purely political nature of adopting a legal
standard of “whatever [their objectives] are.”112
Regarding the second prong of the Hunter/Seattle test, the

109

BAMN, 701 F.3d at 486.
Id. at 482–83.
111
Id. at 486.
112
Id at 483.
110
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Sixth Circuit’s opinion in BAMN purports to protect minority
interests from majority manipulation of the political process.
For instance, the court stated that Hunter and Seattle “set the
benchmark for when the majority has not only won, but has
rigged the game to reproduce its success indefinitely.”113
Undoubtedly, such a rigging would violate fundamental
fairness, but the conclusion that Proposal 2 does so is
inconsistent with historical fact. The affirmative action
programs at issue were voluntarily implemented through a
political process in Michigan with a smaller minority
population than exists today.114 Ignoring this fact, however, the
Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the implied assumption that
majority and minority interests are necessarily permanently set
in opposition and on the dubious conclusion that all members
of a group think and vote the same way. Supreme Court cases
related to racial preferences since Grutter contain language
skeptical of such thought. In Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle, for example, a plurality of the prevailing
majority noted that racial classifications “reinforce the belief,
held by too many for too much of our history, that
individuals should be judged by the color of their skin,” and
“endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation
divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of
racial hostility and conflict.”115
Despite the BAMN court’s concerns with manipulation of
113
114

Id. at 474–75.

Census data reveal that since 1980, whites, as a percentage of the total
population of Michigan, have been decreasing steadily from about 84% in 1980 to
about 79% in 2010. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 1980 Census of Population (1980),
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980/
1980censusofpopu80124uns_bw.pdf; U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of General
(2010),
available
at
Population
and
Housing
Characteristics
http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/10_DP/DPDP1/
0400000US26 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
115
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). See also Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 705 (“‘When
we attribute equal protection rights to groups rather than to individuals, ‘it reinforces
the perception that members of the same racial group—regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have
rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.’” (citing Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993))).
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the political process, the opinion itself arguably turns the
political process on its head. The practical result is that only
university officials, specifically the faculty, can determine
whether race should be considered when setting admissions
standards.116 Following the logic of the BAMN court, even if
every voter in the state except those on the admissions
committee and at least a few members of a minority group
who considered racial preferences to be in their interests
wanted to prohibit racial preferences, they would be overruled
by a relatively small number of faculty.117 Alternatively, the
Sixth Circuit apparently would approve a state constitutional
amendment that provided in detail every aspect of the
admissions process, as this would not single out race at the
most remote level of government. Obviously, this would be an
unwieldy policy, but it is the only other practical way a state
could prohibit affirmative action under the BAMN decision
once a university had decided to implement it. As it stands, the
BAMN decision arguably places unchecked power in the hands
of a few faculty members, many—if not all—of whom are
protected from political pressure by tenure.118
It is true that the rule of law should allow a very few to
overrule the very many in pursuit of fidelity to foundational
principles. But in contrast to the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in Coalition for Economic Equity v.
Wilson119 suggests that just the opposite occurred when
Proposal 2 was overturned. Ruling on political process theory

116

Writing in dissent, Judge Gibbons cites the testimony of the deans of the
University of Michigan Law School and Wayne State’s law school, both of whom
testified that all admission decisions rest with the faculty with essentially no process
existing to overturn their decisions. In fact, the Dean of Wayne State testified that any
attempt by the university’s board of governors to overrule faculty decisions regarding
admissions would “precipitate a constitutional crisis.” BAMN v. Regents of the Univ.
of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 499–500 (2012).
117
In fact, while no one seriously believes that any constitutional provision or
other form of law represents unanimity of opinion, Proposal 2 does represent the
collective political will of the people of Michigan on this issue.
118
As an aside, anyone who has sat through a faculty meeting could tell you that
it is not out of the realm of possibility that changing the minds of the electorate at
large would be easier than changing the minds of a group of professors—less expensive,
maybe, but not necessarily easier.
119
Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
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as it applied to Proposition 209 in California, the court noted
that there is no affirmative requirement for the government to
consider race in the decision-making process. The court stated:
To hold that a democratically enacted affirmative action program is
constitutionally permissible because the people have demonstrated a
compelling state interest is hardly to hold that the program is
constitutionally required. The Fourteenth Amendment, lest we lose sight of
120
the forest for the trees, does not require what it barely permits.

Again, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit
arguably gave insufficient weight to the idea that there is a
difference
between
lobbying
for
protection
from
discrimination and lobbying for racial preferences. The
changes to political process that the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional in Hunter made it more difficult for
individuals to seek protection from discrimination. In contrast,
Proposal 2 made it more difficult for anyone to lobby for
racial preferences. The Sixth Circuit addressed this difference
by finding that the BAMN plaintiffs were not asserting a right
to an outcome, but a right to lobby using the same process as
for non-race related changes to policy.121 If accepted at face
value, there is some force to that argument. But Proposal 2 did
not deny anyone of any race the opportunity to lobby for racebased admissions policy changes differently than anyone else.
Thus, while the BAMN court stated that “the Constitution
does not protect minorities from political defeat: Politics
necessarily produces winners and losers,”122 it seems to have
belied that principle with its ruling. If individuals in favor of
affirmative action are free to compete in the same process as
those against it, then the only thing left for the BAMN court
to find objectionable is the likelihood of political defeat by
numerically smaller advocacy groups. This being the case, the
different outcomes sought in Hunter and BAMN are relevant

120

Id. at 709.
The irony of this assertion seems to have escaped the BAMN court. Under the
University of Michigan’s admissions plans, Asians and Caucasians must overcome not
merely procedural barriers, but substantive ones that other groups do not have to leap.
In fact, at times these barriers are insurmountable because no amount of lobbying the
body politic will change an individual’s race.
122
BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 474–75 (2012).
121
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and substantially erode Hunter’s applicability to BAMN.
The differing context of the Seattle case also leads to the
conclusion that it is a bad analogy for the BAMN case. In
BAMN, the court emphatically noted the fact that the Seattle
case did not remediate de jure segregation, but instead sought
to espouse integration. This was certainly true, but the Sixth
Circuit over-extended itself with the following statement:
“There is no material difference between the enactment in
Seattle and Proposal 2, as both targeted policies that benefit
minorities by enhancing their educational opportunities and
promoting classroom diversity.”123 To the contrary, quite
significant differences exist in the contexts of admissions in
higher education and that of K-12 schools.124 In fact, the very
race-based busing at issue in Seattle has subsequently been held
to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle125 precisely because
of the differences in the Seattle busing plan and the Grutter
admissions plan. The Parents Involved Court found that the
race-based admission policies of Seattle Public Schools were
more akin to Michigan’s unconstitutional undergraduate
admissions plan because they “rely on racial classifications in a
‘nonindividualized, mechanical’ way.”126 The Court further
stated, “In upholding the admissions plan in Grutter . . . this
Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions of
higher education. . . . The present [Parents Involved] cases are
not governed by Grutter.”127 Thus, Seattle’s precedential value
to the BAMN case erodes as much as does that of Hunter, if
for different reasons.
From a broader perspective, Proposal 2 did set race apart as
a category so that making a change to admissions policy in that
area is arguably more burdensome than in other areas. But that
is correctly viewed as consistent with the Supreme Court’s

123

Id. at 478.
See generally J. Kevin Jenkins, Grutter, Diversity & Public K-12 Schools, 182
ED. LAW REP. 353 (2004) (discussing the application of Grutter in the K-12 education
124

context).
125
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
126
Id. at 723.
127
Id. at 725.
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Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence and its underlying
principles. It makes sense that anyone seeking to amend policy
so that racial preferences may be granted by government
would have a harder time than, say, someone seeking to do
away with preferences for athletes. No one has a fundamental
right to be considered for admission without regard to their
lack of athletic ability. But everyone has at least a presumptive
right to be considered without regard to race.128
Concerning the fundamental right to be treated by the
government without regard to one’s race, it is important to
note that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that that is an
individual right, not a group right.129 In Adarand v. Pena, the
Court stated, “The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution protect persons, not groups.”130 More recently in
Grutter, the Court affirmed this principle, adding, “We are a
‘free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality.’ It follows from that principle that ‘government
may treat people differently because of their race only for the
most compelling reasons.’”131 More recently still, in Parents
Involved, the Supreme Court listed a litany of precedents
upholding this notion, going back to the Brown v. Board of
Education cases, in which the Court stated, “At stake is the
personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public
schools . . . on a nondiscriminatory basis.”132 In the face of the
Court’s insistence on the individual right to equal protection,
it is difficult to imagine it upholding the notion that groups
have a collective right to a specific process to lobby for what is
only barely permissible and only for a limited time.133
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Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(noting “the presumptive invalidity of a State’s use of racial classifications to
differentiate its treatment of individuals.”).
129
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
130
Id.
131
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
132
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 743 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300
(1955) (emphasis in Parents Involved opinion)).
133
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”). See
also Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting the time
limitation on affirmative action programs in employment).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit in BAMN and the Ninth Circuit in
Coalition for Economic Equity ruled on a very similar issue:

whether a state constitutional amendment prohibiting the
consideration of race in the context of college admissions
violates the Equal Protection Clause under political process
theory. But the Sixth and Ninth Circuits reached conclusions
that were at opposite ends of the spectrum. Consequently,
whether the Equal Protection Clause is violated by such
amendments currently depends on whether the state that
passed the amendment is in the Sixth or Ninth Circuit. As to
states outside those jurisdictions, the law is unknown.
Considering the likely continuation of efforts to enact ballot
initiatives in states outside the Sixth and Ninth Circuits,
conflict around this issue will surely continue.134 Further, for
reasons described above, the BAMN court’s application of
political process theory to Proposal 2 arguably erodes the
substantive guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause and the
fundamental principle of the rule of law. The opposing
opinions from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits lead to both
confusion and unpredictability in this area of law and a
variation of substantive, even foundational, rights across states.
In order to provide for consistency and predictability, the
Supreme Court must take the opportunity presented by the
Michigan case to reconcile the dichotomy established by the
existing appellate court decisions.

134
See, e.g., Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Affirmative Action: State
Action (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/affirmative-

action-state-action.aspx, for a list of recently passed ballot initiatives or referenda
outlawing racial preferences in several states.

